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Abstract
Taxation and state enforcement of property rights share many common resources. Both
are involved in determining the revenue of the state. Due to these interactions, taxation and
property rights enforcement of a proprietary state are complementary. Any change in the
administrative capacity of the state that increases the taxation rate also increases the level of
property rights enforcement, and vice versa. The capacity and incentive of the proprietary
state to tax are also essentially the capacity and incentive to enforce property rights. Extra
enforcement powers of the proprietary state might therefore increase rather than decrease
production.  2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The theory of the firm has dwelt in depth on the concepts of demand and
strategic complementarity or substitutability, and the economies of scale and
1scope. Literature on the state has applied some of these concepts. Dudley (1991)
and Hirshleifer (1995) analyze some historical stylized facts concerning the state
using the concept of economies of scale. Lane (1942) discusses the economies of
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scope between taxation and property rights enforcement. This paper attempts to
study formally the interactions between two central state functions of taxation and
property rights enforcement by using the concepts of complementarity and
economies of scope.
There has been extensive analysis of the economic importance of a property
rights regime (Demsetz, 1967; Bush, 1974; Skogh and Stuart, 1982; Yang and
Wills, 1990; Skaperdas, 1992; Grossman and Kim, 1995; Hirshleifer, 1995). It is
also recognized that both taxation and state property rights enforcement are
important in deciding the revenue of the state and performance of the economy
(Grossman, 1998). However, existing literature on property rights, taxation, and
the proprietary state (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977; Grossman and Noh, 1994;
Marcouiller and Young, 1995; McGuire and Olson, 1996; Grossman, 1997;
Konrad and Skaperdas, 1998; McGuire, 1998) has not yet focused on analyzing
the interactions between taxation and state enforcement of property rights.
The literature on the proprietary state has also not dealt explicitly with the
economic implications of certain features of the cost function of taxation and state
property rights enforcement. For instance, in Grossman and Noh (1994), Marcouil-
ler and Young (1995), McGuire and Olson (1996), and Grossman (1997), taxation
has a distorting effect on productive labor supply, creating deadweight losses.
Taxation and public provision of order, however, incur no administration costs.
This is unrealistic. Coercion, control, and monitoring of the population, like all
other economic activities, require resources. Due to this oversight, there has not
been any formal analysis of the economies of scope between taxation and state
property rights enforcement. Other features of the cost function of taxation and
property rights enforcement have also not been analyzed.
This paper fills in the above gaps by formally analyzing the interaction between
taxation and property rights enforcement of a proprietary state in terms of revenue
and cost. It brings in formally the cost function of taxation and state property
rights enforcement. Complementarity characterizes the interactions between the
two policies: a change in the administrative capacity of the state that increases the
taxation rate also increases the level of property rights enforcement, and vice
versa. The complementarity between taxation and state property rights enforce-
ment has two components: revenue complementarity and economies of scope.
The state extracts revenue from the population through taxation. It uses part of
this revenue to finance property rights enforcement. Property rights enforcement
enhances the productivity of the economy and increases taxation revenue. This
results in the revenue complementarity between taxation and property rights
enforcement: increased property rights enforcement raises the marginal revenue of
taxation, and vice versa. On the other hand, taxation and property rights
enforcement share many common resources. For instance, both the information
capacity and the coercion capacity of the state are essential for enforcing taxation
and the property rights regime (Dudley, 1991). These are the economies of scope
between taxation and property rights enforcement: increased taxation lowers the
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marginal cost of property rights enforcement, and vice versa. With revenue
complementarity and economies of scope between taxation and state property
rights enforcement, the capacity and incentive to tax are also the capacity and
incentive to enforce property rights.
This paper shows that the interactions between taxation and property rights
enforcement due to revenue complementarity and economies of scope have
important implications. We have a more complete understanding of issues on
property rights, conflicts and the proprietary state when the interactions between
taxation and state property enforcement are considered formally.
2. The model
This is a two-stage game with two types of players: the proprietary state and a
large number of economic agents. The state maximizes its profits. The profits of
the state are its gross tax revenue minus the costs of taxation and property rights
enforcement. The state taxes the production of the agents and penalizes the
2predation of the agents. The agents maximize their net personal income.
In stage one, the state sets its taxation rate and level of property rights
enforcement.
In stage two, the agents allocate their labor endowment between production and




(a) There are n identical atomistic agents. n is a large number.
(b) The labor endowment of the agents is the only factor of production in the
3economy. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor supply.
(c) The agents acquire income through production as well as through preying on
the production of others.
4(d) The agents do not self enforce property rights.
(e) The production function is
2P(l ) 5 al 2 b(l ) . (1)i i i
2For simplicity we assume the labor supply of the agents is fixed. Net income then measures utility.
3We focus on the allocation of labor endowment between production and predation. We ignore the
issue of leisure.
4Endogenizing the amount of private enforcement of property rights, as in Grossman and Kim
(1995), will not affect the central arguments of the paper.
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We assume that a . 0, b . 0 and a . 2b. P(l ) refers to production of agent i.i
The subscript i denotes the identity of the agent. l refers to the labor input ofi
agent i for production.
(f) The predation function is
5S(1 2 l ) 5 S 3 (1 2 l ). (2)i i
S(1 2 l ) is the proportion of production of the other (n 2 1) agents that isi
preyed on by agent i. S is the efficiency parameter of predation; S . 0. (1 2 l )i
6is the labor input of agent i for predation.
(g) There is no external or self-sufficient sector. Secession from the economy is
impossible.
(h) When producing, the agents are taxed by the state. The proportionate tax rate
is t. When preying, the agents face property rights enforcement by the state. The
state enforces property rights by restitution. It identifies production lost through
7predation, recovers it, and returns it to the owner. f is the restitution rate.
(i) For the representative agent i, his net personal income acquired through
production (net of loss from the predation of all other (n 2 1) agents and the
taxation of the state) and preying on the production of all other (n 2 1) agents
(net of the restitution effort of the state) is
n21 n21
y 5 1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )OS(1 2 l ) P(l ) 1 (1 2 f )S(1 2 l )OP(l ), (3)S Di j i i j
j±i j±i
where y refers to the net personal income of the agent and the subscripts i and j
denote the identity of the agents.
8(j) In aggregate, predation does not create wealth. It merely transfers. The total
income of the economy (Y) is therefore the sum of gross production of the
agents:
n
Y 5OP(l ). (4)i
5Conflict functions (Hirshleifer, 1988, 1995; Skaperdas, 1992) analyze contests over resources
among a small number of contestants. This paper analyzes the case of a large number of agents. There
is a free rider problem in the enforcement of property rights. The participants find it worthwhile to prey
on the production of others but not to enforce property rights.
6An alternative interpretation is that the model takes the amount of private enforcement of property
rights as given and incorporates its effects in the parameter S.
7Restitution is used as a metaphor here. Our focus is on how the state changes the allocation of
agents’ effort between predation and production. The main conclusions of the paper remain unchanged
if we use other measures of adequacy in property rights enforcement.
8Since the agents do not enforce property rights, predation does not cause damages or injuries. For
simplicity, we also assume that agents do not resist the restitution effort of the state. Given this
assumption, there are no damages or injuries during restitution as well. Allowing for destruction during
predation or restitution will not change the main results.
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2.1.2. The agents’ decision
Given that all the other n 2 1 identical agents have made their income-
]
maximizing decisions on labor input into production and predation, denoted by l
]
and (1 2l), agent i solves the Lagrangian function:
] ]
max y 5 (1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)S(1 2l))P(l ) 1 (1 2 f )S(1 2 l )(n 2 1)P(l).i i i
l i
(5)
We concentrate our analysis on the interior equilibrium where the agents allocate
9their labor endowments between both predation and production, so that 0 , l , 1.
] ]
By the assumption of identical agents, we have l 5l and 1 2 l 5 (1 2l) at ai i] ]
symmetric equilibrium. We denote l as l and (1 2l) as (1 2 l) for notational
convenience.
From solving Eq. (5), the first-order condition is
(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2 l)S)P9 2 (1 2 f )S(n 2 1)P 5 0. (6)
















]] . 0. (11)
≠t ≠f
For convenience, we adopt the following notational simplifications:
2 2 2dY dY ≠ Y ≠ Y ≠ Y
] ] ] ] ]]; Y , ; Y , ; Y , ; Y , ; Y .f t 2 ff 2 tt tfdtdf ≠t ≠f≠f ≠t
From inequality (7), a higher restitution rate increases total production. A higher
taxation rate decreases total production, as seen in inequality (8).
9The interior solution at a symmetric equilibrium is unique. For proof, check the slope of the reaction
function of the labor decision of agent i with respect to the labor decision of other agents and its second
derivative.
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By changing the net returns from production and predation, taxation and
restitution alter the agents’ allocation of effort between predation and production.
From inequality (9), restitution has a diminishing positive effect on total
production. From inequality (10), taxation has an increasing negative effect on
total production. An increased restitution rate decreases the negative effect of
taxation on total production and an increased taxation rate increases the positive
10effect of restitution on total production, as seen in inequality (11).
The above results show that gross production depends on taxation and
restitution rates:
Y 5 Y(t, f ). (12)
Proposition 1. The establishment of a state increases production if the state
enforces a restitution rate higher than the tax rate, and conversely.
Proof. From Eq. (6), production with the proprietary state takes place at
(1 2 t) P
]]]]] ]5 (1 2 l) 1 .P9(1 2 f )(n 2 1)S
Under anarchy, t 5 0 and f 5 0. Production under anarchy therefore takes place at
1 P
]]] ]5 (1 2 l) 1 .P9(n 2 1)S
Differentiating the right-hand side of both equations above with respect to l, we
have
≠((1 2 l) 1 (P/P9)) P0P
]]]]]] ]]5 2 . 0,2≠l (P9)
where P0 5 2 2b , 0 by assumption (e). The right-hand side of the two equations
above are monotonically positively related to l and P. Production under the
proprietary state is greater than production under anarchy if ((1 2 t) /(1 2 f )) . 1.
Proposition 1 therefore holds. h
Taxation and restitution alter the net returns of production and predation. The
relative net returns of production and predation determine the agents’ allocation of
11labor endowment between production and predation. When the restitution rate
exceeds the taxation rate, relative net returns from production under the state
exceed those under anarchy. As a result, the agents devote more effort to
production and less effort to predation.
10These results are due to the concavity of the production function. See Appendix A for details.
11Refer to inequalities (7) and (8).
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2.2. The state
2.2.1. Assumptions
(a) The proprietary state is the only law making and enforcement agency in the
defined territory.
(b) The state is autocratic. It does not recruit its members from the population at
12large.
(c) The state does not participate in production. The state maximizes its profits
through taxation and enforcement of property rights (restitution).
(d) The costs of taxation and restitution are denoted by
C(t, f ) 5 at 1 bf 2 ktf 1 G(t) 1 H( f ), a . 0, b . 0, k . 0. (13)
A larger a (b) means that the state is less efficient in taxation (restitution). The
extent of economies of scope between taxation and restitution (≠C /≠t ≠f ) is
13measured by k.
There are policy specific costs: a . k and b . k.
G(t) and H( f ) are functions with well-defined first and second derivatives,
2 2 2 2where ≠G /≠t $ 0, ≠H /≠f $ 0, ≠ G /≠t $ 0, and ≠ H /≠f $ 0. The value of
2 2 2 2
≠ G /≠t and ≠ H /≠f measures the speed at which marginal administrative cost
rises with increasing taxation and restitution rates. The greater the second
2 2 2 2derivative ≠ G /≠t (≠ H /≠f ), the faster the marginal administrative cost rises
14with increasing taxation (restitution) rate.
For convenience, we adopt the following notational simplifications:
2 2
≠C ≠G ≠H ≠ G ≠ H
]] ] ] ]] ]]; k ; C , ; G , ; H , ; G , ; H .tf t f 2 tt 2 ff≠t≠t ≠f ≠f ≠t ≠f
2.2.2. The state’s decision
To maximize its profits, the state solves
max tY(t, f ) 2 at 2 bf 1 ktf 2 G(t) 2 H( f ) (14)
t, f
subject to the income maximization of the agents.
Differentiating Eq. (14) with respect to t yields
tY 1 Y 2 a 1 kf 2 G 5 0 (15)t t
and differentiating Eq. (14) with respect to f results in
12This simplification exempts us from endogenizing the size of the state and the economy.
13For a detailed analysis of the costs of property rights enforcement, see Stigler (1970).
14Marginal administrative cost could rise for the following reasons: (1) diminishing returns, (2)
diseconomies of scale, (3) increasing input prices, (4) capacity constraints, and (5) constitutional or
political constraints.
88 J. Teng / Journal of Public Economics 77 (2000) 81 –95
tY 2 b 1 kt 2 H 5 0. (16)f f
*We denote the optimal taxation and restitution rates of the proprietary state by t
* *and f . The corresponding level of total production is denoted by Y . We analyze
15* *the interior solution where 0 , t , 1 and 0 , f , 1.
Solving Eqs. (15) and (16) with respect to changes in efficiency in taxation (a)
and restitution (b), we have:
Proposition 2. The optimal taxation and restitution rate for the proprietary state
are complementary. An increase in the taxation efficiency of the state raises the
restitution rate. An increase in the restitution efficiency of the state raises the
16taxation rate.
This complementarity is best understood by examining inequality (A.11):
* *df dt 1 1
]] ] ] ]5 5 2 (tY 1 Y 1 k) 5 2 (MR 2 C ) , 0,tf f tf tfda db uJu uJu
where uJu is the Jacobian determinant. MR is marginal revenue.
2 C 5 k . 0: This is the economies of scope between taxation and restitution.tf
Any increase in taxation rate lowers the marginal cost of restitution and vice versa.
MR 5 ≠MR /≠t 5 ≠MR /≠f 5 (Y 1 tY ) . 0: An increased tax rate raises thetf f t f tf
marginal revenue from restitution and vice versa. This is the revenue complemen-
17tarity between taxation and restitution.
The revenue complementarity can be broken down into two parts:
(a) tY arises because of interaction between taxation and restitution ontf
18production.
19(b) Y arises since more restitution raises the tax base.f
Due to the revenue complementarity and economies of scope between taxation
and restitution, an increase in taxation efficiency raises the restitution rate and vice
versa.
15For the uninteresting case of costless administration, the model has an implausible implication
where both taxation rate and restitution rates are set to one. This is due to the assumption that there is
no secession from the economy.
16Mathematically, if the off-diagonal elements of the two by two Jacobian determinant are positive
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Given the complementarity between taxation and restitution, we have Proposi-
tions 3 and 4.
Proposition 3. If increasing the restitution rate causes a substantial rise in the
marginal administrative costs, better taxation efficiency then reduces total
production. If marginal administrative costs do not rise substantially when the
20restitution rate is raised, better taxation efficiency then raises total production.
Better efficiency in taxation raises both the taxation rate and restitution rate.
Higher taxation reduces production. On the other hand, a higher restitution rate
increases production. The net effect on production depends on the relative size of
adjustment in the rates of taxation and restitution.
If raising the restitution rate increases the administrative costs substantially, the
increase in the restitution rate is small. The negative effect on production due to
increased taxation overwhelms the positive effects of increased restitution. Thus,
better efficiency in taxation raises the tax rate and lowers production, and makes
21agents worse off.
Increased ability by the government to extract resources from the producers may
increase production. The state can extract resources from both the producers
(taxation) and the predators (restitution). So long as the state accompanies its
increased taxation with a higher restitution rate, production need not be lowered.
Proposition 4. If the economies of scope between taxation and restitution are
extensive, better efficiency in restitution then reduces production.
If the economies of scope between taxation and restitution are scanty, better
22efficiency in restitution then increases production.
Better efficiency in restitution raises both the taxation and restitution rates. The
effect on production depends on the degree of economies of scope between
taxation and restitution. When there are extensive economies of scope, the increase
in the tax rate is large. The negative effect of a higher tax rate overwhelms the
positive effect of a higher restitution rate. Better efficiency in restitution therefore
decreases production. With a higher tax rate and a lower production, agents are
23worse off.
20Refer to Appendix A for proof.
21When raising the restitution rate does not increase the administrative costs substantially, we are not
sure whether the net of tax income of the agents increases or decreases.
22Refer to Appendix A for proof.
23When the economies of scope are scanty, we are not sure whether the net of tax income of the
agents increases or decreases.
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3. Conclusion
Viewed in isolation, the taxation capacity of the state is generally considered to
affect the economy negatively (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977; Marcouiller and
Young, 1995). Taxation causes distortions in the economy.Viewed in isolation, the
property rights enforcement capacity of the state is almost unanimously considered
to affect the economy positively (Grossman and Kim, 1995; McGuire and Olson,
1996). Property rights enforcement curbs predatory activities and encourages
production.
If an increase in state capacity to tax causes distortions and reduces the
efficiency of the economy, then how do we explain the concomitant rise of the
modern states and the modern economies in Europe and elsewhere? The modern
states have much greater taxation capacity than their medieval predecessors
(Webber and Wildavsky, 1986).
If an increase in state capacity to enforce property rights improves economic
performance, then how could one explain the disappointing economic performance
of the post-WWII welfare states? These states have great capacity for control and
enforcement due to the build up of state capacity during WWII (Tilly, 1992).
‘English disease’ is the term that describes the sluggishness of these states (Olson,
1982).
This paper shows that taxation and state property rights enforcement should not
be studied in isolation, given their revenue complementarity and economies of
scope. The capacity and incentive of the proprietary state to tax are also essentially
the capacity and incentive to enforce property rights. An increase in state capacity
that leads to a higher taxation rate also results in a higher level of property rights
enforcement. As a result, we do not know a priori the net effect on total production
level.
To determine the effect of an increase in state capacity to tax and enforce
property rights on total production, we need more information on the cost
functions of taxation and property rights enforcement. Specifically, we need to
know the degree of economies of scope between taxation and property rights
enforcement and the marginal administrative costs facing the state in raising the
level of property rights enforcement.
Better efficiency in taxation does not necessarily reduce production. If the
marginal administrative costs do not rise sharply when the state raises the level of
property rights enforcement, the accompanying increase in the level of property
rights enforcement is large. Better efficiency in taxation then increases production.
States with more enforcement power therefore do not necessarily have a lower
production.
The establishment of large standing armies in Europe greatly increased the
taxation capacity of the European states and was associated with great economic
progress (Tilly, 1992). Concomitant with the rise of the large standing armies and
powerful bureaucracies was the rediscovery and development of the Roman law,
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which culminated in the Code Napoleon. These improvements in jurisprudence
greatly aided the refinement of the property rights regime. The positive effects of a
better property rights regime overwhelmed the negative effects of a higher taxation
(North and Thomas, 1973).
Better efficiency in property rights enforcement does not necessarily increase
gross output. If property rights enforcement and taxation have very extensive
economies of scope, then the accompanying increase in the tax rate is large. Better
efficiency in property rights enforcement then reduces production.
During World War II, the Western states built up their administrative capacity.
They have therefore become more efficient in enforcing property rights. These
states, however, also raised their taxation, especially for financing welfare
programs. The resulting distortions due to higher taxation adversely affected their
economic performance (Lindert, 1994).
To conclude, it is important that we understand how different policies of the
state interact. One aspect of the interaction between different state policies is the
complementary or substitute relationship examined in this paper. We need this
understanding for evaluating the economic effects of events that affect state
capacity. Examples include the dismantling of the state machinery in the former
Soviet Union and the reform of China. This understanding is also important for
evaluating proposals to constrain or augment state capacity in certain policy areas,
such as the suggestion by Brennan and Buchanan (1977) to limit the state’s
taxation capacity.
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max y 5 (1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)S(1 2l))P(l ) 1 (1 2 f )S(1 2 l )(n 2 1)P(l).i i i
l i
(A.1)
The first-order condition is
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] ]
(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)S(1 2l))P9 2 (1 2 f )S(n 2 1)P(l) 5 0. (A.2)
The second-order condition is
]
P0(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2l)S) , 0.
Solving the problem of all the agents simultaneously, we have
2
≠ Y /≠l ≠fdl 2 (n 2 1)S((1 2 l)P9 1 P)i i
] ]]] ]]]]]]]]]]( ; l ) 5 2 5 . 0,f 2 2df P0(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2 l)S)≠ Y /≠li i
Y 5 nP9l . 0, (A.3)f f
2
≠ Y /≠l ≠tdl P9i i
] ]]] ]]]]]]]]]]( ; l ) 5 2 5 , 0,t 2 2dt P0(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2 l)S)≠ Y /≠li i
Y 5 nP9l , 0, (A.4)t t
21 2]]]]]]]]]]Y 5 n (P0)((n 2 1)S) ((1 2 l)P9S Dff P0(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2 l)S)
1 P)h(2P9(1 2 l) 1 P) 1 P9((1 2 l) 1 (1 2 f )l )j , 0, (A.5)f
21 2]]]]]]]]]]Y 5 n (P0)h3(P9)S Dtt P0(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2 l)S)
2
2 (P9) (1 2 f )(n 2 1)Sl j , 0, (A.6)t
21
]]]]]]]]]]Y 5 n (P0)(n 2 1)Sh 2 2P9(P)S Dtf P0(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2 l)S)
2 2
2 3(P9) (1 2 l) 2 (P9) (1 2 f )l j . 0. (A.7)f
The state’s decision
The state solves
max tY(t, f ) 2 at 2 bf 1 ktf 2 G(t) 2 H( f ) (A.8)
t, f
subject to the income maximization of the agents.
The second-order condition requires that the Jacobian determinant be positive:
(tY 1 2Y 2 G ) (tY 1 Y 1 k)tt t tt tf f
uJu 5U U
(tY 1 Y 1 k) (tY 2 H )tf f ff ff
2 2 2
5 t (Y Y 2 (Y ) ) 1 2t(Y Y 2 Y Y ) 2 (Y )tt ff tf t ff f tf f
2
2 2ktY 2 2kY 2 k 2 tY G 2 tY H 2 2Y H 1 G H .tf f ff tt tt ff t ff tt ff
The first six terms of the above expression are negative, where
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2 212 ]]]]]]]]]](Y Y 2 (Y ) ) 5 n (P0)(n 2 1)SS S D Dtt ff tf P0(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2 l)S)
2(2P9P ) , 0
and
312 ]]]]]]]]]](Y Y 2 Y Y ) 5 (n )S Dt ff f tf P0(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2 l)S)
2 2h(P9) (n 2 1)SPl (P0) (1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2 l)S)j , 0.f
To have a positive Jacobian determinant we need either a large positive G or Htt ff
or both.
Using the implicit function rule and the Cramer’s rule, we have
*dt 1
] ]5 (tY 2 H ) , 0, (A.9)ff ffda uJu
*df 1
]] ]5 (tY 1 2Y 2 G ) , 0, (A.10)tt t ttdb uJu
* *df dt 1
]] ] ]5 5 2 (tY 1 Y 1 k) , 0. (A.11)tf fda db uJu
Proof of Proposition 3.
* * *dY dt df
]] ] ]]5 Y 1 Yt fda da da
1
]5 (Y (tY 2 H ) 2 Y (tY 1 Y ) 1 k)t ff ff f tf fuJu
1 2]5 (t(Y Y 2 Y Y ) 2 Y 2 Y k 2 Y H ),t ff f tf f f t ffuJu
where (Y Y 2 Y Y ) , 0.t ff f tf
2In (t(Y Y 2 Y Y ) 2 Y 2 Y k 2 Y H ), the first three terms are negative. Thet ff f tf f f t ff
fourth term is non-negative.
2*dY /da is therefore negative for a small H , (t(Y Y 2 Y Y ) 2 Y 2 Y k)(1 /Y )ff t ff f tf f f t
2and positive for a large H . (t(Y Y 2 Y Y ) 2 Y 2 Y k)(1 /Y ). hff t ff f tf f f t
Proof of Proposition 4.
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* * *dY dt df
]] ] ]]5 Y 1 Yt fdb db db
1
]5 (2Y (tY 1 Y 1 k) 1 Y (tY 1 2Y 2 G ))t tf f f tt t ttuJu
1
]5 (t(Y Y 2 Y Y ) 1 Y Y 2 Y G 2 Y k),f tt t tf t f f tt tuJu
where
312 ]]]]]]]]]](Y Y 2 Y Y ) 5 (n )S Df tt t tf P0(1 2 t 2 (1 2 f )(n 2 1)(1 2 l)S)
3((2(n 2 1)SP)(P9) P0) , 0.
In (t(Y Y 2 Y Y ) 1 Y Y 2 Y G 2 Y k), the first three terms are negative. Thef tt t tf t f f tt t
fourth term is non-negative.
*dY /db is therefore positive for large k . (t(Y Y 2 Y Y ) 1 Y Y 2 Y G )(1 /Y )f tt t tf t f f tt t
and negative for small k , (t(Y Y 2 Y Y ) 1 Y Y 2 Y G )(1 /Y ). hf tt t tf t f f tt t
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